

# **Heed Neglect, Disrupt Child Maltreatment**



**Lindsey Bullinger (Georgia Tech)**

**Meg Feely (University of Connecticut)**

**Kerri Raissian (University of Connecticut)**

**Will Schneider (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)**


370%



# Short Term



**Attachment Problems**



**Cognitive Development**



**Social Functioning**



**Depression & Behavioral Problems**



**Worse Health**



**Unemployment & Poverty**



**Use of Social Services**



**Crime**


**Long Term**

**\$428**

**billion**


75%

neglect



Note: Trend estimates represent total change from 1992 to 2016. Annual rates for physical abuse and sexual abuse have been multiplied by 2 and 3 respectively in Figure 1 so that trend comparisons can be highlighted.

# Childhood Fatality Rates from 1970-2016, By Cause of Death



Data are from Vital Statistics and the Children Bureau's Child Maltreatment Reports.  
Rates are per 100,000 children in each age group except congenital malformations where deaths are per 1,000 live births.

# HOW?

1. Clearly identifying the fatality outcome

2. Understanding the mechanisms that lead to the cause-specific mortality


3. Implementing macro-level policies and campaigns to change behaviors


# MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT FATALITIES

1. Riding *in* vehicles was clearly identified. Goal became reduce MV accidents by making *all* driving safer (i.e., universal prevention involves everyone driving the speed limit, not just those identified as unsafe).

2. Research determined the primary factors in MV fatalities.


3. Advocates identified interventions (e.g., requiring car/booster seats, passing graduate drivers licensing policies, enacting speed limits, enforcing law affecting impaired driving BAC laws, minimum legal drinking age laws, zero tolerance laws, higher alcohol taxes). Awareness campaigns. Manufacturers improved safety of vehicles.






**“Reducing neglect is challenging because it seems to be the result of complex and unidentified interactions that our current health and social services systems do not effectively prevent.”**








**“Neglect is not necessarily the result of intentional behaviors that can be influenced or easily changed, especially if larger macro-level factors are at play that suppress the family’s ability to promote child well-being.”**



**What causes  
neglect?**



**“If we accept that poverty is a causal factor in the  
perpetration of neglect, we can begin to reduce neglect  
(and its consequences) long before the exact mechanisms  
are understood.”**



# Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2021)

## The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science



**AAPSS**  
The AMERICAN ACADEMY of  
POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE

### The Social Welfare Policy Landscape and Child Protective Services: Opportunities for and Barriers to Creating Systems Synergy


Megan Feely, Kerri M. Raissian, William Schneider, Lindsey Rose Bullinger

First Published January 29, 2021 | Research Article | 

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716220973566>

# Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)


## Time & Money



# Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

## Time & Money

## Macro-level factors & systems synergy




# Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

## Time & Money


## Macro-level factors & systems synergy

## Child neglect = unemployment rate



**SOME EXAMPLES**






**“The typical minimum wage earner is a provider and a breadwinner—most likely a woman—responsible for paying bills, running a household and raising children.”**

**--Thomas Perez, United States Secretary of Labor (2014)**





**Substantial Overlap**

# Cancian, Yang, & Slack (2013)

[Social Service Review](#) > [Volume 87, Number 3](#)

[NEXT ARTICLE](#)

## The Effect of Additional Child Support Income on the Risk of Child Maltreatment

[Maria Cancian](#), [Mi-Youn Yang](#), and [Kristen Shook Slack](#)

[University of Wisconsin–Madison](#)[Louisiana State University](#)[University of Wisconsin–Madison](#)

# Cancian, Yang, & Slack (2013)

TABLE 2. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Models Predicting Screened in Child Maltreatment Reports

	Models		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Experimental group	.892** (.048)	.879** (.048)	.881** (.050)

**\$100 per year reduced screened-in reports by 2 percentage points (10%).**

# Raissian & Bullinger (2017)

Children and Youth Services Review 72 (2017) 60–70



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

## Children and Youth Services Review

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth)

Money matters: Does the minimum wage affect child maltreatment rates?

Kerri M. Raissian<sup>a,\*</sup>, Lindsey Rose Bullinger<sup>b</sup>

# Raissian & Bullinger (2017)

	Report rate	Neglect rate	Physical abuse rate	Other abuse rate	Substantiation rate	Removal rate
<i>All children</i>						
Minimum wage (2005 \$)	- 93.39 <sup>+</sup>	- 68.44 <sup>**</sup>	- 15.47	- 11.13	- 12.37	- 1.267
	- 55.31	- 28.3	- 10.69	- 21.25	- 13.83	- 3.762
Effect size	- 8.76%	- 9.61%	- 6.01%	- 3.74%	- 4.92%	- 1.78%
Average dependent variable	1066	712	257	298	251	71

**\$1 increase in MW reduces neglect reports by 10%**

## Berger et al. (2017)

# Income and child maltreatment in unmarried families: evidence from the earned income tax credit

[Lawrence M. Berger](#) , [Sarah A. Font](#), [Kristen S. Slack](#) & [Jane Waldfogel](#)

[Review of Economics of the Household](#) **15**, 1345–1372 (2017) | [Cite this article](#)

**1924** Accesses | **46** Citations | **20** Altmetric | [Metrics](#)

# Berger et al. (2017)

	Abuse	Neglect	CPS Investigation
<i>Single-mother families (2,581 observations of 1,127 families)</i>			
Percent	35.34	37.97	7.59
Model 3: All controls	-0.0069	-0.0122*	-0.0058*
(income estimate presented)	(0.0048)	(0.0049)	(0.0025)
F-statistic (first stage)	194.72	194.72	194.72
Model 4: Add state fixed effects	-0.0048	-0.0124*	-0.0058*
(income estimate presented)	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0026)
F-statistic (first stage)	186.07	186.07	186.07
Model 5: With family fixed effects	0.0050	-0.0103†	-0.0070†
(income estimate presented)	(0.0056)	(0.0062)	(0.0038)
F-statistic (first stage)	138.65	138.65	138.65

**Increase in income from EITC of \$1,000 reduced CPS involvement by 7-10%.**

**Kovski et al. (2021)**

## Association of State-Level Earned Income Tax Credits With Rates of Reported Child Maltreatment, 2004–2017

Nicole L. Kovski , Heather D. Hill, Stephen J. Mooney, Frederick P. Rivara, Erin R. Morgan, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

Show less ^

First Published January 19, 2021

Research Article

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<https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559520987302>



# Kovski et al. (2021)

	Overall Reports	Neglect Reports	Physical Abuse Reports	Emotional Abuse Reports	Sexual Abuse Reports	Overall Substantiations
All Children	-220 (-455, 15) *	-241 (-449, -33) **	-21 (-58, 16)	-32 (-106, 42)	6 (-16, 28)	-55 (-120, 10) *
By Child Age						
Ages 0-5	-276 (-563, 9) *	-324 (-582, -65) **	-22 (-69, 25)	-49 (-139, 41)	6 (-21, 33)	-89 (-179, 1) *
Ages 6-17	-194 (-403, 16) *	-201 (-387, -15) **	-19 (-50, 12)	-25 (-91, 42)	5 (-15, 25)	-40 (-95, 15)
N	689	689	689	658	689	689

**10 % pt increase in state EITC reduced neglect reports by 10%**

## Biehl & Hill (2018)

# Foster care and the earned income tax credit

[Amelia M. Biehl](#)  & [Brian Hill](#)

[Review of Economics of the Household](#) **16**, 661–680 (2018) | [Cite this article](#)

**512** Accesses | **7** Citations | **12** Altmetric | [Metrics](#)

## Biehl & Hill (2018)

	Entry	Entry
State EITC * Federal expansion	-0.286** (0.134)	-0.293*** (0.075)
State and year fixed effects	X	X
Full set of control variables		X
Sample: Always SEITC and Never SEITC states		
Observations	420	420

**EITC expansion from ARRA2009 (~\$1,000) reduced foster care entry by 7.5%**

# Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

How does the minimum wage affect child maltreatment and parenting behaviors? An analysis of the mechanisms

[William Schneider](#) , [Lindsey Rose Bullinger](#) & [Kerri M. Raissian](#)

[Review of Economics of the Household](#) (2021) | [Cite this article](#)

**280** Accesses | [Metrics](#)

# Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

**\$1 increase in MW reduces spanking by 22%**

	Maternal spanking <sup>a</sup>			
	(1) Year 3	(2) Year 5	(3) Year 9	(4) City FE <sup>a,b</sup>
Minimum wage (\$2016)	-0.079*** (0.021)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.04)
Lagged outcome in year 1	0.299*** (0.029)	0.072* (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)	
Lagged outcome in year 3		0.364*** (0.027)	0.126*** (0.031)	
Lagged outcome in year 5			0.194*** (0.030)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)				0.302*** (0.017)
Age 5				-0.274 (0.216)
Age 9				0.132 (0.426)
Age 5 × min wage				0.048 (0.035)
Age 9 × min wage				0.043 (0.033)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.1217	0.1960	0.1010	0.1261
Mean Y	0.55	0.5	0.51	0.47
N		1347		4041

# Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

	Physical aggression <sup>a</sup>		Psychological aggression <sup>a</sup>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Year 5	Year 9	City FE <sup>a,c</sup>	Year 5	Year 9	City FE <sup>a,c</sup>
Minimum wage (\$2016)	-0.38 (0.057)	-0.222** (0.083)	0.148* (0.060)	0.059 (0.039)	-0.157** (0.054)	0.187*** (0.043)
Lagged outcome in year 3	0.075*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.009)		0.058*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome in year 5		0.072*** (0.008)			0.051*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)			-0.049*** (0.002)	0.080***		-0.042*** (0.002)
Age 5						
Age 9			1.146** (0.422)			0.326 (0.306)
Age 5 × min wage						
Age 9 × min wage			-0.271*** (0.053)			-0.206*** (0.036)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.170	0.1831	0.1987	0.1270	0.1706	0.1499
Mean <i>Y</i>	1.29	1.67	1.57	8.44	9.21	8.35
<i>N</i>	805		1610	886		1772

**\$1 increase in MW reduces physical aggression by 27%**

# Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

	Physical aggression <sup>a</sup>			Psychological aggression <sup>a</sup>		
	(1) Year 5	(2) Year 9	(3) City FE <sup>a,c</sup>	(4) Year 5	(5) Year 9	(6) City FE <sup>a,c</sup>
Minimum wage (\$2016)	-0.38 (0.057)	-0.222** (0.083)	0.148* (0.060)	0.059 (0.039)	-0.157** (0.054)	0.187*** (0.043)
Lagged outcome in year 3	0.075*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.009)		0.058*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome in year 5		0.072*** (0.008)			0.051*** (0.006)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)			-0.049*** (0.002)	0.080***		-0.042*** (0.002)
Age 5						
Age 9			1.146** (0.422)			0.326 (0.306)
Age 5 × min wage						
Age 9 × min wage			-0.271*** (0.053)			-0.206*** (0.036)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.170	0.1831	0.1987	0.1270	0.1706	0.1499
Mean <i>Y</i>	1.29	1.67	1.57	8.44	9.21	8.35
<i>N</i>	805		1610	886		1772

**\$1 increase in MW reduces psychological aggression by 21%**

# Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

**\$1 increase in MW  
reduces maternal  
employment by 6.5%**

	Maternal employment <sup>a</sup>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Year 3	Year 5	Year 9	City FE <sup>b</sup>
Minimum wage (\$2016)	-0.02 (0.022)	-0.036* (0.019)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.252 (0.032)
Lagged outcome in year 1	0.321*** (0.024)	0.205*** (0.025)	0.127*** (0.030)	
Lagged outcome in year 3		0.274*** (0.024)	0.163*** (0.030)	
Lagged outcome in year 5			0.227*** (0.025)	
Lagged outcome (pooled)				0.324*** (0.015)
Age 5				0.409* (0.200)
Age 9				0.053 (0.391)
Age 5 × min wage				-0.075* (0.031)
Age 9 × min wage				-0.028 (0.029)
$R^2$	0.1218	0.1752	0.1733	0.1289
Mean $Y$	0.52	0.55	0.51	0.54
$N$		1436		


# Schneider, Bullinger, & Raissian (2021)

**\$1 increase in MW  
reduces working  
weekend shifts by 70%**

Sometimes work evening shift <sup>a</sup>				Sometimes work weekend shift <sup>a</sup>			
(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Year 3	Year 5	Year 9	City FE <sup>b</sup>	Year 3	Year 5	Year 9	City FE <sup>b</sup>
-0.003 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.039)	0.038* (0.019)	-0.036* (0.016)	0.015 (0.019)	0.026 (0.026)
0.098** (0.035)	0.101* (0.049)	0.017 (0.042)		0.074* (0.034)	0.152*** (0.043)	0.019 (0.036)	
	0.003 (0.036)	0.044 (0.047)			0.032 (0.034)	0.024 (0.034)	
		0.033 (0.040)				0.021 (0.029)	
			0.083*** (0.021)				0.087*** (0.018)
			0.269 (0.235)				0.583*** (0.157)
			0.507 (0.486)				0.279 (0.309)
			-0.053 (0.037)				-0.100*** (0.025)
			-0.048 (0.034)				-0.027 (0.024)
0.0642	0.0603	0.0522	0.0358	0.0307	0.0531	0.0346	0.031
0.1	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.1	0.08	0.12
	657				922		

# Feely, Raissian, Schneider, & Bullinger (2020)

## Time & Money



**CONCLUSIONS**

# CONCLUSIONS

1. Neglect remains intractable.

2. Policies that address the underlying social & economic problems contributing to poverty offer promise.

3. Likely because they target the macro-level environment that may lead to neglect.

**Thank you!**

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